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## DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
SECRET	OPPW-29770
TO Chief of Base, Munich Chief of Station, Germany	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 29-6-106/1
FROM Chief, SR via Chief, WE	DATE
REB REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA/UPSWING Headquarters' Views on AEDOGMA	RE: 43-2 (CHECK ONE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED Field's views are solicited.	DEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCES:  
A. MUNI 5850  
B. EGMA 43247, 26 June 1959

### SYNOPSIS

Some doubts have arisen in Headquarters about Subject's potential in Paris and [ ] is asked to re-assess this potential.

Headquarters is concerned about the continued UPSWING contact with Subject and solicits the Field's views on how best to terminate this contact if we continue to employ Subject, and what the related problems are.

1. The closer scrutiny to which this case has been subjected since the receipt of reference A revealed second thoughts and outright doubts on the part of some of the interested Headquarters elements on the question of Subject's potential in Paris. We genuinely regret this apparently abrupt change in the unanimity of Headquarters' enthusiasm and are uncomfortably aware that these reservations and doubts should have come to light and been resolved prior to his transfer to Paris, but we can only say that it is better that this problem be met head-on now than that it should exist without being recognized and measured by both the field and Headquarters. [ ] may have made known to you the substance of some of the Headquarters' views on this case. We herewith undertake to stimulate an exchange of views on the matter.

2. AEDOGMA is being run in Paris in an operation the product of which is destined largely [ ] consumption. It would thus appear that the [ ] is in the best position to comment on the value of the product, or more correctly, the value of his potential, since AEDOGMA has not been established in Paris long enough for us to judge fairly the value of his current production. Perhaps [ ] has already formed some conclusions as to the degree to which Subject can be realistically expected to achieve the goals set in paragraphs 5 and 7 of the project outline. We will then measure [ ] estimate of the value of AEDOGMA's production and/or potential against the time, money and effort which the case costs, plus the related considerations (liaison, security, etc.) to determine whether we should continue to employ Subject in his current capacity and in his current post. In addition to furnishing an estimate of the value of AEDOGMA's contribution, we would appreciate hearing how he is handled, by whom, and how much case officer time is involved. You will also recall that Subject's project contains a provision for making up to him the loss of income incurred by his severance of contact with UPSWING and AECAVATINA. We would like to know the status of Subject's AECAVATINA contacts and whether or not he is receiving any financial aid from that organization or UPSWING.

3. If Headquarters and [ ] conclude that AEDOGMA can continue to be used in Paris as foreseen in his project outline, we must then find a satisfactory solution to the problem of terminating his UPSWING contact. Headquarters views with considerable concern the continued UPSWING contact with Subject as mentioned in reference A. This development appears to complicate matters to an undesirable degree and may furthermore contain considerable flap potential which, at its worst, could involve three services

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78-1410-063/11

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in an unpleasant squabble. Some of the problems which are created or affected by the fact of UPSWING/KUBARK contact with AEDOGMA in France, and on which we should like to hear the views of both Paris and Munich, include the following:

a. The likelihood that UPSWING has revealed its relationship with AEDOGMA to the French through [ ] It seems quite possible that UPSWING would not wish to risk the indignant wrath of the French upon the discovery of an "unrevealed" UPSWING operation in Paris, and has therefore possibly cleared Subject's move to Paris through the [ ] liaison officer in Munich.

b. Further complication is introduced into the affair if UPSWING told the French of our contact with AEDOGMA or if the French learned of it on their own. It seems not unlikely that the French could have learned of AEDOGMA's intelligence activities on behalf of UPSWING and/or KUBARK, perhaps during the long time it took to issue Subject's visa. This could leave us in an unpleasant position vis-a-vis the French.

4. One method of terminating the UPSWING contact with Subject would be to brace him on the matter and insist that he break off all contact with UPSWING, report any UPSWING attempts to keep the contact alive and furnish pertinent details on his past association with UPSWING, especially any information which he may have withheld up to now. Enforcing such a decision would clearly be difficult, but even Subject's reaction to instructions to break with UPSWING could be interesting and might furnish some indication of the direction and degree of his loyalty to KUBARK and UPSWING. It may well be difficult for AEDOGMA to terminate a relationship of long standing with persons who are personal friends as well as professional colleagues, but the current situation seems to offer as good an opportunity as will come along. If Subject's relationship with UPSWING is such that his loyalties are really divided, the sooner we learn this, the better. Munich is asked to comment on the desirability of concurrently informing UPSWING of our instructions to AEDOGMA to break all contact with them in order to clear the air and determine just what the UPSWING interest and equity in AEDOGMA is. At the risk of restating the obvious, we wish to emphasize one consideration in this whole matter: that we should do nothing toward trying to break AEDOGMA's ties with UPSWING unless and until we have satisfied ourselves that he has a long-range potential working for KUBARK in France (or elsewhere, for that matter). To put it another way, if he proves to be of no value to us in France, we may well decide to urge him to look to UPSWING for his livelihood in the future, and premature burning of this bridge might well leave us with a thoroughly undesirable disposal problem.

5. Learning the true and complete story of Subject's UPSWING ties takes on added importance in view of the possible implications of Subject's being handled by or in contact with two UPSWING case officers; one of them, Heinz SCHMALSCHLAEGER, an old Abwehr colleague and GE specialist. Even without considering the unclearly defined security reservations about SCHMALSCHLAEGER and his boss, @ RISCHKE, one might theoretically entertain the suspicion that Subject is being run by UPSWING against the AIS, or even against the RIS, without KUBARK knowledge.

6. Again, while we realize that Subject has probably not been in Paris long enough for [ ] to have formed definite views on the operation, we hope that some valid though general observations can be made. With these, and a future exchange of views with the field, we hope to be able to judge Subject's worth more accurately and to resolve the issue of his UPSWING contact.

12 November 1969

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30 Nov 59